
Camp Able Sentry in Skopje, Macedonia.

U.S. Air Force (Michael J. Haggerty)

# Developing a Strategy for Troubled States

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The number of states undergoing internal unrest has increased notably since the Cold War. This has created some 45 million refugees and internally displaced persons, three times the number reported ten years ago. Communal violence exacerbated by ethnic, religious, or other differences has become far and away the preponderant form of conflict over the past five years, even though threats of interstate belligerency remain high in some regions. Deaths from violence, famine, and disease cannot be accurately estimated but run into the millions. Physical and political damage to states has included anarchy and massive destruction of their meager infrastructures. Internal unrest has sometimes led to conflicts with neighboring states and burdened them with waves of refugees. These severe problems threaten world stability, the advancement of human rights and democracy, and on occasion more tangible U.S. interests, including those of strategic importance.

The United States and the international community have channeled substantial energy and capital into efforts intended to resolve or mitigate internal upheavals, including grandiose, idealistic approaches described as the New World Order, Agenda for Peace, and "assertive multilateralism." They have discovered no generally applicable formula for assured success in the short term, remain

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unsure of the best long-term solutions (such as sustainable development), and in any event will not dedicate the considerable resources required. Yet they have also found it impossible to simply turn their backs and walk away.

This article briefly assesses the causes and means available to deal with what for the lack of a better term are often called "troubled states." The focus is on employing the Armed Forces, with emphasis on areas to be improved on the strategic or policy level as well as the operational level.

## Background

Unrest in troubled states is fueled by long-term, systemic crises such as overpopulation, environmental damage, food shortages, poverty, income disparity, corruption, and bad governance as well as societal divisions. There is also a propensity to appeal to ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or other forms of separatism for solace, protection, and identity. Such movements often pressure the regimes of the day, seeking to redress grievances, promote special interests, or simply take power. They fracture existing institutions and heighten the chance of emotion and violence prevailing over rational dialogue. Governments, in turn, have lost power and become vulnerable to fragmentation and particular causes. This is attributable to freer international communication; the increased power of global organizations, corporations, and criminal networks; and the spread of democracy, individual liberty, and private-sector economic systems at the expense of state control.

Absent Cold War restraints and a preoccupation with major conflicts, international law and organizations and individual nations have increasingly intervened in response to internal problems, particularly when violence erupts. The very substantial capabilities and resources of many defense establishments—freed from East-West confrontation—have become engaged in humanitarian and peace operations as well as more conventional activities, such as supporting allies, protecting vital interests, and preparing for major regional conflicts. Such operations frequently combine political, economic, diplomatic, and military actions supported by multinational coalitions—and occasionally multinational police. There is no sign of a diminution in the troubled-state phenomenon and attendant unrest in the next decade. Thus the Armed Forces can anticipate being immersed in multinational humanitarian and peace operations, though they may consider them as improper uses of resources or an unwelcome diversion from what they regard as more appropriate, traditional military roles.

Such operations have varied implications for $C^4I$, force selection and deployment, logistics and transport, availability of equipment, funding, et al. While the actual size and composition of U.S. and other forces will obviously vary depending upon country-specific situations, the activities and operational environment most frequently associated with these operations include:

- logistic and other support for—even direct roles in—benign humanitarian operations, including rapid provision of large-scale relief that surpasses readily available civilian resources, civil affairs and human rights support, and possible protection of relief operations in low-risk environments
- logistic and other support for—even direct roles in—small- to med-sized coalition peace operations, largely military in nature (observation, force separation, demilitarization, demining, and weapons control), conducted in low-risk environments with participating forces not being major combat units
- support for—even direct roles in (to include command of)—complex, med-sized civil-military peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in more dangerous environments
- bilateral and multilateral noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs)
- bilateral and multilateral enforcement of blockades, embargoes, and no-fly zones
- participation in and command of major coalitions for expanded peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in hostile environments.

## Non-Military Strategy

*Early Action*. U.S. strategy should focus initially on the early identification of potentially troubled states and the effort to improve conditions before a crisis develops which requires urgent international military or humanitarian intervention. The best means of achieving that end is through conventional bilateral and multilateral instruments of assistance to address the causes of both short- and long-term tension, enhance stability, and improve governance. The many different attempts to prevent or resolve conflict by short-term actions have revealed the extreme difficulty of the task and the importance of tackling root causes. More long-term bilateral and international attention to intrinsic problems in troubled states will be needed, including social, economic, environmental, and other conditions, as well as mid-term issues such as greater political representation and more equitable resource distribution, and better trained and behaved military and security forces.

This situation is aggravated by reductions in bilateral and multilateral economic, social, and military assistance. The decline in spending has major implications for available global resources, including programs for preventive action in troubled states. This comes at a time when there is an

obvious need for more constructive use of international and regional organizations as well as ad hoc bilateral and multilateral activities. This trend will be difficult to reverse given the prevalent congressional mood of disengagement and deep cuts in support for civilian agencies which operate abroad (except the Central Intelligence Agency). However, not to do so will over time increase the burden on the Armed Forces, including defense budgets and force readiness. It can dangerously erode U.S. influence built up arduously over fifty years, thus damaging vital long-term interests.

*Second Stage*. The next stage would be a prompt response to resolve or contain a crisis to avoid greater problems and large-scale intervention. Usually this involves concerted multinational action of a primarily civilian nature with legitimization and support from regional or international organizations, focused on a rapid delivery of crisis assistance (food, medicine, and short-term job creation). Bilateral regional or international teams could survey and assist urgent socio-economic, human rights, and defense needs. They could include both U.N. and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) as well as civilian and military representatives of individual nations. Furthermore, they could survey future intervention possibilities should situations worsen.

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A preliminary assessment would be conducted of the desirable objectives and the types and levels of required resources, other contributors, and whether the situation demands unilateral, multinational, or international action. There should also be an interagency effort to collect data on the country in question and to begin contingency planning on a combined basis for civilian and military organizations likely to participate. The supporting diplomatic actions that would be needed prior to any force commitment include:

- consultations with U.N., international, and regional organizations and governments to communicate and obtain responses to the U.S. proposition that military action should be taken
- efforts to create a multinational core group, possibly including regional organizations, willing to assist through political influence, financial support, and/or direct civilian or military participation
- diplomatic approaches to U.N. and other international and regional organizations to mobilize support and legitimize intervention.

One alternative to direct intervention that ought to be weighed is economic sanctions. Sometimes implemented by the use of naval and air forces, this sort of action has political appeal and has been employed in recent years against Iraq, Bosnia, and Haiti. However, the effectiveness of embargoes is increasingly questioned since they are perceived as punishing the poor while not achieving their objectives within a reasonable time.

## Political-Military Strategy

*Doctrine and Planning*. While nothing new for the military, the number and frequency of recent peace operations (or low intensity conflict), and growth of forces and supporting elements involved, has resulted in a new presidential policy directive (PDD–25) as well as new joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Despite improved doctrine and more experienced policymakers, however, one must expect that not every decision will be made in accordance with a preplanned blueprint. PDD–25 provides valuable advice but no doubt will continue to be interpreted flexibly. Public opinion, the views of friendly states, and broadly construed national interests (human rights, promoting democracy, and humanitarian issues) may result in intervention even when important U.S. security or economic objectives are not directly threatened.

Joint and service doctrine and other pubs on humanitarian and peace operations have appeared, including the *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* issued by the Joint Warfighting Center. Both doctrine and training emphasize effectively combining political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, and security considerations of military operations. However, there remains a need for overall doctrine, consistently applied, that provides for integrated planning and incorporates lessons learned from recent peace operations. (Some of those lessons that were successfully adopted in planning for the multinational force in Haiti were not put into practice when preparing for the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and other recent operations.)

This means that civilian agencies as well as the Armed Forces should be ready to execute the necessary contingency plans, crisis management, and resource allocation. Such capabilities for civilian agencies require major improvements. Moreover, both civilian and military organizations should strengthen interagency planning, crisis management, and combined surge capabilities. At present, there are variations in knowledge, planning, and assets among agencies, often resulting in improvisation in the field, with the military taking on what were assumed to be civilian missions.

The United States is the only military power that can meet the eventualities of any peace operation on its own, and it is the most capable nation in the world when it comes to assuming the lead in orchestrating effective coalitions. Capabilities developed over the years for other missions, including major regional as well as low intensity conflicts, are directly relevant to peace operations. Thus when a decision is made to participate in such operations the Nation does not lack the military capacity. Instead, there is a problem of generating political will (including allocation of resources) and then determining the level of the commitment and selecting the appropriate forces. In addition, it is necessary to effectively coordinate the appropriate civilian and military assets, including those of both international organizations and other countries.

However, the poor use of the Armed Forces negatively impacts on public support, morale, operating tempo, and readiness for all missions across the board. Thus basic U.S. capabilities for conducting actual peace operations must be refined and augmented, not diminished to give priority to contingency preparations for possible larger conflicts. The critical requirement for the United States is fielding a wide variety of combat support assets (including aviation) from the active and Reserve components. Over the past five years these elements have been placed under severe stress in terms of their operating tempo, whereas regular combat units have been much less utilized. Looking ahead, one can see the need to augment combat support elements.

At the same time, every effort must be made to minimize the demands on forces without reducing the prospects for success. For instance, experience has revealed that a decision not to deploy any personnel for participation in a coalition peace operation means that such a coalition is unlikely to be formed, or if it is, that it will be much less effective than with the inclusion of even a small U.S. contingent such as a headquarters element, logistical units, and SOF. Limited involvement by the United States can be justified in terms of obtaining greater overall benefits from other participants.

The U.S. strategy for military involvement should be premised on mobilizing a coalition to share political and resource burdens while ensuring capacity and credibility. That means getting on top of an opponent—either political or military—and staying on top, even while minimizing the use of force and preserving an even-handed approach to minimize casualties and avoid an unnecessary armed clash. Initial forces must have an overpowering edge in firepower, $C^3I$, logistics, and SOF, including psychological operations (PSYOP). It also means political, diplomatic, and intelligence support from civilian agencies. Military action must be linked to effective, early humanitarian and economic support from national and international civil resources. PSYOP and public information programs intended to solidify political support at home and abroad should be implemented rapidly, as an essential part of the overall operation.

Our political-military strategy should be premised on plans to exit completely as well as on interim measures to replace active forces with Reserve units, foreign forces, or civilian assets after initial stabilization. It should include long-term, systematic assistance to the U.N. and regional bodies (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of American States, and the Organization of African Unity) as well as selected governments to improve both individual and collective capabilities. This will enable others to operate absent U.S. participation or with greatly reduced U.S. transport, logistics, and equipment. (When the forces of other nations have not been adequately prepared in advance, however, providing last-minute training and some basic support can also alleviate burdens on U.S. forces by making coalition operations more effective.) International and military education and training, foreign military sales, and other forms of military engagement such as joint/combined exercises should be targeted for this purpose—which clearly falls under the policy of "preventive defense" articulated by the Secretary of Defense. Experience proves that this approach improves long-term military-to-military relations as well as the capabilities of coalition partners to conduct peace operations.

## Coalitions

Establishing coalitions can reduce demands on U.S. resources as well as add to the political effectiveness of an operation. There are international and domestic advantages when other nations contribute forces to peace operations, thus forming a "coalition of the willing." Placing a coalition under the Security Council or regional organization such as NATO provides a forceful legitimizing endorsement, considerably increasing the prospects that other states will contribute to the coalition. But while such participation eases fiscal, personnel, logistics, and materiel burdens, it complicates command and control. Differences will occur in doctrine, training, readiness, and other capabilities, as well as $C^3I$ (since many coalition members have not entered the computer age). The advantage of superior regional political influence and expertise by some partners, as well

as greater international participation, tends to compensate for the lower level of their military capability. The broad, longer-term implications of such combined action for U.S. global and regional policy also militate in favor of accepting some units with lower capabilities as part of a coalition.

The United States should thus minimize but not exclude less-qualified countries and work out in advance the least troublesome, most effective distribution of duties among coalition partners as well as C³I and liaison arrangements (which require diplomatic and military talent). It should also determine coalition needs for additional logistic support, transport, training, and equipment and be prepared to provide it to partners if other sources are not available.

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The United States has shown its ability to manage coalitions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, in some instances employing unorthodox arrangements (such as Russian participation in IFOR). Assessing and covering gaps in essential capabilities of partners will usually involve, at a minimum, providing added personnel and support for C³I (such as radios and computers) and aviation (such as helicopters and C–130s). The Armed Forces should usually provide units trained in the use of less-than-lethal weaponry and PSYOP assets. This is often critical in dealing with civilian demonstrations or armed aggressors hiding behind a screen of unarmed civilians. (The outcome of such confrontations can either make or break the success of a mission because of its impact on public opinion both in the country where the operation is being conducted and at home.)

The command and control of peace operations is also critical. If participation in a mission includes sizable land forces, the United States should lead at least the military side of operations (as in Haiti). Both dual-key and separate-but-related operations (similar to the U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia) should be avoided. Command and control will not be identical to that exercised when the Armed Forces operate unilaterally. However, coordination, cohesion, and unity of purpose can be attained if the United States uses its leverage in the Security Council and other methods to ensure advanced coalition understanding and support a precise mandate, mission, and rules of engagement on the political as well as the operational and tactical levels. This understanding should be reviewed and verified periodically, lest subsequent developments cause an erosion in coalition cohesion as happened in Somalia during UNOSOM II.

Contingency planning for coalitions should provide for integrated and coordinated activities with national and international civilian agencies and NGOs. Absent such coordination—and even with it—there will be unexpected, unplanned, and unbudgeted demands on military capabilities, and operations will not be as effective. There also will be longer periods of U.S. military engagement before an operation is transferred to civilian agencies and organizations. This requires continued efforts by the United States to strengthen the impact of U.N., international, and regional organizations and improve cooperative international planning and operations.

## U.N. Operations

Substantial improvements have been made in the capability of the Peacekeeping Division at U.N. headquarters to manage small- and mid-sized operations, even to coordinate diverse elements such as military and police forces, relief efforts, human rights, civil administration, and elections.[1] However the United Nations itself recognizes that it is unable—even with outside support—to rapidly mobilize a sizable force or conduct operations in a hostile environment (that is, to carry out peace enforcement).

Haiti offers an instructive lesson in the effective use of the United Nations in conjunction with a U.S.-led coalition legitimized under the U.N. banner, and of superior advanced planning by the interagency community in Washington, a theater command (U.S. Atlantic Command), and the U.N. Secretariat. The multinational force (MNF) that was deployed to Haiti restored public order, reinstalled the legitimate government, organized an initial round of elections, started an indigenous police force, and demobilized local forces. After six months, the United States handed off the lead to the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and was then able to significantly reduce its presence, and even more notably to reduce costs (roughly one-third of the U.S. share for MNF). After one year, UNMIH was extended but without the U.S. military contingent. UNMIH was able to maintain momentum generated by MNF with a much smaller force and Canada assuming the lead in providing and commanding the multinational force with only indirect U.S. support.

## Core Competencies

The variety of potential humanitarian and peace operations is vast. Each will be different and require careful assessment of the situation and the strategies and resources required to meet it. This will involve at least initial decisions on the period

and extent of international intervention. Also, if the objective is to alleviate unrest and violence or correct their basic causes, on the magnitude and mix of available multinational military and civilian assets, and on the degree to which the U.S. military will participate. In addition to basic preparations for military commitments, some special aspects of U.S. core competencies warrant consideration. The emphasis is on agility and the adaptability of fundamental training and resources.

*Maintain forces trained for peace operations.* Experience has shown that operations have a greater likelihood of success when there is at least some American participation. In many situations ground combat units can come from elsewhere. There should be a nucleus of highly capable forces from a very few countries, with other forces assigned duties commensurate with their capabilities and suitability (including their culture sensitivity) for the mission. This Nation should be prepared to provide personnel with the skills needed for peace operations.

For purely humanitarian emergencies with little threat of violence, the Armed Forces should be prepared to furnish initial, urgent transport (usually air) plus logistics support in cases when that of international relief agencies is too limited or slow to mobilize. When the humanitarian operation envisaged is faced with a serious danger of armed conflict, the United States should be prepared to deploy SOF and even helicopter gunships or C–130s as well as protection for airports and aircraft.

U.S. forces deployed should have some unique training in peace operations, or those units committed (especially headquarters staffs) should have recent experience in such operations. There is no need for personnel to be designated and trained for peace operations as a primary or exclusive role. Active forces, particularly infantry, can handle most contingencies provided that officers and NCOs have specialized training or recent experience and that units have pre-deployment training for the country in question. Some units such as military police, engineers, PSYOP, and medical and logistical support have even less need for special training, although they also need officers and NCOs with either special training or recent experience in peace operations. Army Special Forces and Marine expeditionary units are ideal for this purpose because their training includes most activities required for peace operations. Experience has shown in situations such as Haiti or Bosnia that Reserve units—as well as individual Reservists—can operate as effectively as active forces once an initial intervention has taken place and a degree of stability has been achieved. Many combat support units rely heavily from the outset on the Reserve components which have proven their effectiveness.[2]

**military commands should be reinforced by civilian agency representatives**

Allies such as France, Britain, Canada, and Holland as well as the Scandinavian countries have routinely incorporated peace operations in their military doctrine and training. Such emphasis also is emerging among Latin American and Asian countries and taking hold within the Partnership for Peace (PFP). Their mutual participation in peace operations exercises provides advantages for all those involved. Combined training by PFP members with both U.S. and other NATO forces in Germany, the United States, and elsewhere prepared them to participate in Bosnia.

Given the experiences of the last few years and projections for the next decade, it appears that a limited number of combat forces as well as specialty units will be used in peace operations. However, the anticipated need for units well trained in such operations as a secondary mission need not exceed two or three regular Army brigades (together with SOF and Marines)—particularly if our Armed Forces provide special skills to boost the capabilities of other countries. To minimize an erosion of conventional combat skills, intensive training could be merged with combat training as is now done during most Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) peace enforcement rotations, and be conducted at least every two years, with "just-in-time" training done prior to deployment.

Additionally, there should be a designated cadre of officers and senior NCOs with training, experience, and proven performance in conducting peace operations. Assignments could include observers for U.N. missions, providing "just-in-time" training, staff positions for headquarters of coalition operations, liaison with civilian agencies, and advisors or augmentees to normal staff of those units about to deploy under JTFs or CJTFs.

*Operate in conjunction with civilian agencies and nongovernment organizations.* Peace operations training for military personnel should include working with civilian agencies and NGOs on contingency planning for civil-military operations and support for humanitarian operations and human rights activities. While such training has been conducted by the Marines, JTRC, and both U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), it requires more emphasis. Units with specific skills such as military police, SOF, engineers, and air support also should conduct brief periodic training together with civilian agency and NGO representatives as well as larger exercises which include Army and Marine ground combat units.

U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis)

**Refugee camp in Goma, Zaire.**

Given the civil-military complexities of most peace operations, need for area and language expertise, and relevance of coordinating humanitarian and political activities in multinational peace operations and vis-à-vis the countries where operations are conducted, military commands should be reinforced by civilian agency representatives with the requisite skills when an operation enters the active planning phase. In country, a well-staffed embassy can assist once proper coordination is established, but it will often be required to augment embassy staffs for this purpose. Moreover, reinforcement will usually be needed at CINC level for the Department of State political adviser and by liaison officers from the Agency for International Development and from its autonomous Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. In addition, civilian liaison officers may be needed with military units below CINC level. Military liaison officers serving with civilian organizations such as U.S. embassies, U.N. field headquarters, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, et al., have also proven to be valuable.

*Public Security*. A peace operation will often require supervising, assisting, retraining, or even establishing an indigenous civil police or constabulary force to provide basic law and order or public security in troubled states. This will usually take place in conjunction with demobilization, reorganization, and/or other restraints on local military forces. Without this measure, it is very difficult to complete the mission successfully enough to execute the exit strategy. Furthermore, its absence contributes to the burden imposed on and risks to U.S. and other military forces involved.

Establishment of a relatively effective civilian police force may well require military as well as civil police assistance, given the likelihood of unsettled or potentially violent conditions. There is also the possibility that indigenous police will not initially have the training, discipline, or structure to command minimal obedience and follow appropriate standards in dealing with the local people, even with the help of civilian international police monitors. The latter do not ordinarily have a mandate to conduct direct police functions or carry arms and, if they did, could be dangerously over-matched by militias, bandits, or the local police force itself. Moreover, recruiting international police contingents is slow work; and the recruits are usually of uneven quality. All this argues for initial assistance by military police and SOF (including PSYOP) to international police monitors as well as local police.

Without the early creation of an indigenous force capable of public order functions, military personnel will have to carry out those functions alone, putting them at greater risk and requiring additional personnel. In Haiti, the United States quickly realized that military police and SOF were needed to provide direct liaison and support for international police monitors as well as for both the interim public security forces (IPSF) and the Haitian national police which replaced them.

Once this occurred, policing proceeded satisfactorily, public security was maintained, the elections took place peacefully, and indigenous police had time to be trained properly and to gradually assume their duties with the confidence of a backup force. This created conditions conducive to the U.S. exit strategy, replacing MNF with UNMIH.

In Bosnia, the IFOR mandate did not include direct support for the international police task force (IPTF), except in the event of an emergency. IPTF arrived slowly and was of uneven competence and had a weak mandate. Its members, along with the local police that they were to assist, were of marginal utility in the face of political intimidation and armed gangs. Public security outside the zones of separation patrolled by IFOR was often inadequate. This made it very difficult to achieve critical civilian mission objectives such as public order, freedom of movement, refugee return, and free elections—and thereby created serious problems for the U.S. exit strategy and timetable.

Army military police together with the much smaller Marine Corps military police and SOF have demonstrated in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti that they can provide the initial assistance needed to train indigenous police/constabulary to take control of public security. Moreover, supplemented by civil affairs personnel, they were able to help initially with judicial and prison administration. Questions regarding the legal status and some other aspects of employing military police and SOF to carry out these activities should be resolved, so that their use can be planned for in advance and they can be employed at the outset of an operation.

*Humanitarian/Human Rights*. This element of peace operations requires close coordination and sometimes direct support from military forces. The key support functions include:

- delivering relief supplies to and inside a problem state (logistics, transport, engineers, and possibly protection), assisting with refugees, and responding to natural disasters
- establishing coordinated civil-military communications and coordinating systems (such as radio frequencies and possibly equipment, joint civil-military operations center, exchange of liaison officers, and use of civil affairs personnel)
- providing assistance for human rights observers and elections (logistics and protection)
- rehabilitating local institutions and infrastructure (civil affairs, logistics, and engineers)
- creating effective police or constabulary forces
- clearing mines.

Experience has indicated that there must be coordinated pre-operation planning with regional, international, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as U.S. civilian agencies in all the above areas to ensure success of an overall operation. This can reduce civil-military confusion, enhance coordination, and minimize the operational tasks of the military by more effective use of civilians. It may be necessary for the military to contribute transport, radios, or computers before civilian assets arrive, but such support should be transferred to civilians as soon as possible. Jointly staffed civilian-military operational coordination cells and an exchange of liaison officers will be needed, from the planning stage to the completion of the exit strategy. As in the case of peace operations, multinational humanitarian operations require planning and exercises conducted with other military organizations to prepare for coalition action. Unified commands, notably PACOM and SOUTHCOM, have already begun to do so.

Peace operations are clearly not a panacea for the problems of troubled states and have been the subject of increasing criticism for wasting resources on less than vital interests and diverting the assets of the Armed Forces from more important missions. However, it is equally clear that the troubled-state phenomenon is far from over, that peace operations will occur in the future, and that U.S. forces will often be involved. It is also evident from the score of operations conducted over the last five years—which have included successes as well as failures—that some approaches work better than others. Important lessons have been learned.

The United States must draw upon and apply these lessons, in practice and theory, so that our Armed Forces (and civilian agencies) are prepared to mount peace operations effectively. This means ensuring that doctrine, training, planning, and resources are appropriate for the diverse tasks which such operations demand—as unpleasant or onerous as they may be—even while submitting critical decisions on U.S. participation and support to careful scrutiny and minimizing their impact on joint warfighting capabilities. **JFQ**

NOTES

[1] Cambodia, Angola, El Salvador, and Haiti are examples of successful U.N. peace operations.

[2] Earlier seasoning in Somalia plus brief pre-deployment training prepared the 10th Mountain Division to lead the multinational force in Haiti. The 25th Infantry Division and the 2d Cavalry were able to replace the 10th Division without a hitch because of prior intensive JTRC training, plus pre-deployment training. The 1st Armored Division profited from training at the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany, before going into Bosnia.